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Abstract
Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation
between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for
worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their
principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them.
Principals can signal their altruism by o¤ering a generous contract,
consisting of a base salary and an output-contingent bonus. I nd
that principals signal their altruism by o¤ering relatively weak in-
centives and a relatively high expected total compensation, but the
latter does not necessarily hold. Furthermore, since some agents do
not reciprocate the principals altruism, the principal may nd it op-
timal to write a contract that simultaneously signals his altruism and
screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is char-
acterised by excessively strong incentives and relatively high expected
total compensation.
Keywords: reciprocity, gift-exchange, signaling game, incentive
contracts, screening.
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1 Introduction
Economists generally recognise that humans pecuniary motives are not the
only determinant of economic outcomes: other considerations play a sig-
nicant role as well. One of these considerations that has received lots of
attention recently is reciprocity, meaning that people are willing to promote
the welfare of a kind person and reduce the welfare of an unkind person,
even if it comes at a personal cost. The importance of reciprocal motiva-
tions in the workplace has been brought under the attention of economists
by Akerlofs (1982) seminal paper on the gift-exchange hypothesis. He de-
scribes labor contracts as a gift-exchange between employer and employee,
where employees e¤ort and employers benevolent treatment of workers are
reciprocal gifts.
Benevolent treatment of employees encompasses several aspects. Of all
the aspects mentioned by Akerlof, the wage level has without doubt attracted
most attention. Numerous laboratory experiments nd a positive relation be-
tween employees e¤ort and the salary o¤ered by the employer.1 However,
the question how the wage level interacts with monetary incentives in estab-
lishing gift-exchange relationships has received far less attention, especially
in theory but also in experiments. This is remarkable, since monetary in-
centives belong to the core of economics. Moreover, the lack of theoretical
investigation is a signicant issue, because theoretical models usually allow
for more generalizable results than a specic experimental setting. In a typ-
ical experiment, the contracting choices are restricted, exposure to risk is
very limited, and players are randomly matched into pairs by the experi-
menter. By contrast, in the real world employers are far less restricted in
their contract choices, incentive schemes typically expose workers to risk, and
employers may screen workers by their contract choices. Therefore, several
subtle e¤ects may come into play when the environment becomes increasingly
realistic.
In this paper, I use a formal principal-agent model to study gift-exchange
in a setting that captures some important complexities of the real world.
The model is inspired by Levine (1998)s game-theoretic approach of mod-
eling reciprocity. The essence of this approach is that the intensity of an
individuals altruism is conditional on his belief about the other individuals
altruism, i.e. an individual cares more for someone who is perceived to care
for him. Applied to the principal-agent model, I assume that the principal is
either altruistic or selsh, and that whether agents are altruistic or selsh de-
1An early experimental study is Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). Fehr and Gächter
(2000) survey the voluminous literature.
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pends on their beliefs about the principals type. However, a typical nding
in laboratory experiments is that not all individuals are equally motivated by
reciprocal tendencies. Therefore, I assume that not all workers are recipro-
cal. Altruistic principals design a contract, consisting of a base salary and an
output -contingent bonus, that signals their altruism and at the same time
provides proper incentives to exert e¤ort. Moreover, the contract can be de-
signed to screen the reciprocal workers. Compared to existing gift-exchange
models, there are thus three innovations. The key innovation is that the
contractual environment allows for an unrestricted choice of base salary and
bonus payments. Another innovation is that I examine the consequences of
worker heterogeneity. In particular, I explore how contracts can be designed
to ensure self-selection of reciprocal worker types and at the same time signal
the principals compassionate predisposition. Finally, I also investigate the
situation where workers can tell from their experience in daily interactions
with their boss whether he genuinely cares for them or not. Although an
extreme case, the ndings yield qualitative predictions for long-term work
relationships.
The results reveal that monetary gift-exchange is a context-dependent
phenomenon. First, I show that when principals abstain from screening work-
ers, gift-exchange is associated with weaker incentives. When gift-exchange
relations are established, there is less need to stimulate workers via monetary
incentives. Second, I nd that the positive relation between wages and e¤ort
may be obscured when principals are not restricted in their contract choices.
Thus, although in our model a generous wage o¤er is always interpreted as
a signal of altruism, o¤ering a high expected total compensation is not a
prerequisite to succesfully signal ones type. Because gift-exchange relations
induce the altruistic principal to weaken monetary incentives, workers e¤ort
is relatively low, and hence a relatively low total compensation sometimes
su¢ ces to distinguish an altruistic from a selsh principal. Third, and per-
haps surprisingly, excessively strong incentives may result when the principal
attempts to signal his benevolent intentions and simultaneously select moti-
vated workers. The paradox is that strong incentives are o¤ered in order to
attract the employees who need them the least. Fourth, when the principals
care for his workers is self-evident, the positive relation between wages and
e¤ort vanishes. In fact, the high quality of the relation may even be reected
in a compensating wage di¤erential. Moreover, a high quality of the relation
weakens the attractiveness of o¤ering strong monetary incentives.
The paper is closely related to an emerging experimental literature on
incentives, contract design and reciprocity. The main ndings of this litera-
ture are compatible with my model. An important issue is whether monetary
incentives crowd out the possibilities for gift-exchange. Inspired by a sub-
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stantial literature in social psychology, it has been suggested that material
rewards may undermine the intrinsic motivation to perform a task, see e.g.
Frey (1997). In the most radical interpretation, the introduction of incen-
tives may thus end all voluntary cooperation, where voluntary cooperation
is dened as the di¤erence between actual and privately optimal e¤ort. This
complete crowding-out hypothesis is generally inconsistent with my model. A
weaker interpretation is that incentives partially crowd out voluntary cooper-
ation. Partial crowding out means that keeping the wage constant, voluntary
cooperation is lower when (stronger) incentives are implemented. My model
is in line with the partial crowding-out hypothesis. According to my model,
a tight link between e¤ort and reward restricts the workers opportunities
to reciprocate a principals favourable treatment, and hence weakens the im-
portance of the workers altruism. The complete crowding-out hypothesis
is hard to reconcile with the experimental evidence. A consistent nding is
that the presence of incentives, when framed as a reward, does not preclude
a positive relation between total compensation and e¤ort, see Güth et al.
(1998), Anderhub et al. (2002), Fehr and Gächter (2002), Bellemare and
Shearer (2007), Gächter et al. (2009) and Rigdon (2009).2 By contrast, Fehr
and Gächter (2002) and Bellemare and Shearer (2009) present evidence in
line with the partial-crowding out hypothesis: the positive relation between
e¤ort and wages is weaker when incentives are stronger. In other words,
although incentives increase total e¤ort, they reduce voluntary cooperation
for a given wage level.
This paper contributes to this literature by pointing at some issues that
have received little or no attention yet. First, my model shows that the
crowding e¤ect will be stronger, the more direct the link between e¤ort and
rewards, i.e. the larger the piece rate. In most of the experimental literature,
however, the incentive scheme is non-linear: a bonus is paid or a ne imposed
conditional on the e¤ort level. It may be worthwhile to investigate the issue
of partial crowding for alternative incentive structures as well. Second, our
model shows that in experiments that provide the principal with multiple
instruments, the method of matching participants may carry important im-
2Three remarks are worth making here. First, Güth et al. (1998) do not deal with
the issue of crowding-out, but their results show that gift-exchange is not inhibited by
incentives. Second, in Gächter et al. (2009), there is either no crowding or complete
crowding depending on experiencing a trust session without incentives rst. Finally, the
study of Bellemare and Shearer (2007) is noteworthy, because it is the only eld study that
considers a rm where workers are paid according to piece rates and it is the only eld
study that nds strong evidence in favor of the monetary gift-exchange. Field experiments
by Gneezy and List (2006), Kube et al. (2006, 2008), Al-Ubaydli et al. (2007) and Hennig-
Schmidt et al. (2008) nd only limited support for monetary gift-exchange.
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plications. Specically, a competitive labor market may induce principals to
set stronger incentives than when agents are matched randomly.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the related
literature. Then, in section 3 I set out the model and analyze the observable
types case, which serves as a benchmark for the next two sections where types
are assumed to be unobservable. In section 4.1, I introduce some simplifying
assumptions in order to analyze in section 4.2 how monetary incentives and
the base salary interact in establishing a gift-exchange relationship. In section
4.3 I study how contracts in addition can help to select reciprocal workers.
Finally, in section 5 I conclude and provide some avenues for further research.
2 Related literature
In economics, several authors have suggested ways of modeling reciprocity, for
example Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004),
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009). Our
model is based on Levines approach because it provides a tractable and nat-
ural way to model the ndings reported in organizational psychology and
management: when employees infer that their manager or the organization
cares about their well-being, they reciprocate with increased commitment,
loyalty, and performance (see, for example, the reviews by Rhoades and
Eisenberger 2002 and Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). Despite the recent
attention for modeling reciprocal behavior in the workplace, there are only
few studies that investigate the relation between gift-exchange and monetary
incentives.
One of them is Englmaier and Leider (2008). They also present a principal-
agent model with conditionally altruistic and risk averse agents, allowing for
endogenous determination of the strength of incentives and the base salary.
Their main nding is that incentive pay and reciprocal motivations are substi-
tutes, which is qualitatively in line with our results. Despite these similarities,
there are some crucial di¤erences. Most important, Englmaier and Leider as-
sume that positive reciprocity is automatically induced when agents expect
to receive a rent. By contrast, in our model reciprocity is not conditional on
receiving a rent, but on the belief concerning the principals type. As a con-
sequence, the principal has to manipulate the agents belief, implying that,
indeed, reciprocal workers earn a rent in equilibrium. Thus, a distinguish-
ing feature of my model is the presence of incomplete information, leading
to strategic considerations. These considerations underly my nding that
better gift-exchange relations do not always require a higher total expected
compensation, as assumed by Englmaier and Leider. Another di¤erence is
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that Englmaier and Leider restrict their study to contracts that implement
an exogenously given (discrete) e¤ort level at the lowest costs, whereas in my
model the optimal e¤ort level is endogenously determined by trading o¤ the
costs of incentives against the benets of e¤ort, conditional on the workers
reciprocal tendencies.
Another paper that studies the relation between reciprocal motivations
and incentive pay is Dur, Non, and Roelfsema (2008). However, their model
does not allow for monetary gift-exchange, but focuses on social gift-exchange
instead, meaning that the resources of the gift-exchange are non-monetary.3
In particular, in Dur, Non and Roelfsema (2008), the managers gift consists
of management attention. Another simplication is the absence of incomplete
information. Both limitations are addressed by Dur (2009), but his model
does not allow for incentive pay.
A working paper by Arbak and Kranich (2005) is closest to mine in the
sense that incomplete information and Levine-type conditional altruism are
key features of their modeling set-up. However, they do not examine how
the base salary and incentives interact in credibly signaling the principals
altruism. Moreover, they assume that a limited-liability constraint is always
binding, whereas I require that the contract satises the agents participation
constraint. Also, while they assume that agents are risk-neutral, in my model
agents are risk averse. Finally, by incorporating heterogeneity of worker types
I extend the analysis to study the possibilities for screening.
Another related paper is Bellemare and Shearer (2009), who develop a
theoretical model of gift-exchange to generalize their experimental results.
Interestingly, they study the optimal composition of a gift in terms of an
increase in the base salary or the piece rate. They nd that an increase in
the piece rate is superior to an equivalent increase in the base salary. The
main reason is that piece rates have a direct incentivizing e¤ect, in addition
to the e¤ect of the reciprocity induced by the gift. The di¤erence in results
follows from the di¤erence in assumptions. Bellemare and Shearer do not
allow for strategic uncertainty and risk aversion and assume that a limited-
liability constraint is always binding
Our paper is also connected to experimental studies on other incentives
than rewards, such as imposing a minimum e¤ort requirement or a ne to be
3As argued by Akerlof (1982), managers benevolent treatment of workers encompasses
several aspects. Studies in management and organizational psychology distinguish be-
tween two broad categories: economic resources and socioemotional resources. Economic
resources address "nancial needs and tend to be tangible", whereas socioemotional re-
sources address "social and esteem needs (and are often symbolic and particularistic)."
(Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005, p. 881) In economics, monetary gift-exchange refers to
the former, whereas social gift-exchange in the cited papers refers to the latter.
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paid in case of veried shirking. A laboratory experiment by Falk and Kos-
feld (2006) shows that the implementation of a minimum e¤ort requirement
reduces e¤ort, because a considerable group of individuals interpret such an
action as a sign of distrust. The implementation of a ne in case e¤ort does
not meet a prescribed level has a similar e¤ect, as shown by Fehr and Gächter
(2002) and Fehr and List (2004). Their experimental evidence shows that,
in the words of Fehr and List (2004, p. 743), "incentives based on explicit
threats to penalize shirking backre by inducing less trustworthy behavior".
However, as noted above, these results do not extend to incentives that are
framed as a reward. From a gift-exchange perspective, distrust is apparently
not the only inference workers can make when confronted with explicit in-
centives. Nevertheless, my paper is in line with some noteworthy results in
this literature. I nd that incentives themselves do not inhibit gift-exchange,
it is the combination of salary and incentives that matters in establishing
gift-exchange relations. Interestingly, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) run a treat-
ment that allows the principal to decide not only on installing a minimum
e¤ort level, but also on the amount of salary to be paid. In this treatment,
higher wages lead to higher average e¤ort levels irrespective of the principals
decision to control. Moreover, Fehr and List (2004)s study on the relation
between nes and trust shows that when a punishment option is available but
the principal deliberately refrains from using it, agents exhibit much more
trustworthy behavior than when a punishment option is not available. Both
results illustrate that we cannot explain the e¤ect of explicit incentives when
studied in isolation.
Another topic I address is how contracts can select reciprocal worker types
and at the same time signal the principals altruism. Although I am the rst
to delve into this issue, my model is not unique in designing a contract that
fullls the dual role of signaling to and screening of the other contracting
party. Sliwka (2007) also studies contracts that signal the principals private
information and at the same time screen workers. The main idea in his pa-
per is that incentives signal that selsh behavior is the social norm, which
demotivates the conformistic agents in the population. In addition to this
signaling e¤ect, incentives may also screen worker types when selsh and
altruistic workers di¤er in their preferences over incentive intensity. Hence,
the optimal decision whether to trust or to incentivize agents takes both the
signaling and selection e¤ect into account. An important di¤erence with my
analysis however, is that in Sliwka the principal faces the binary decision
whether to trust or incentivize workers, whereas in my model the princi-
pal has two continuous instruments (wage and base salary) at his disposal.
Therefore, the principal has richer opportunities to simultaneously signal to
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and screen workers.4
3 The model
3.1 Description of the model.
I consider a risk-averse worker and a risk-neutral principal. The worker is
conditionally altruistic, meaning that the extent to which he is altruistic
depends on the principals altruism. The expected utility of a worker of type
i is described by:
ui =   exp r[b(e+")+s  12 e2+i(bj)E(j)] : (1)
This specication is widely used to describe the utility of risk-averse agents,
where r captures the extent of risk-aversion. The production function is
simply given by e¤ort e, but is prone to random shocks " that are normally
distributed with variance 2. E¤ort is non-contractible, but assuming that
output can be observed, the worker earns a share b of observed output (e+")
and a base salary denoted by s. The costs of e¤ort exerted by the worker are
represented by 1
2
e2, and i(bj) represents the extent of workers altruism
towards his principal, which positively depends on the workers belief about
the principals altruism bj. Workers di¤er in their altruism function i(bj),
where 0  i(bj) < 1. I distinguish between a workers typeand a workers
altruism. A workers type refers to his altruism function, whereas his
altruismrefers to the outcome of the function i(bj). I refer to type k as
being more altruistic than type i if and only if k(bj)  i(bj) for all bj,
where the inequality should be strict for at least some bj. Note that the
agent cares about the principals expected payo¤E(j) instead of his actual
payo¤. The reason is that it would be nonsensical to assume that the worker
is risk-averse over the payo¤ of a risk-neutral principal. As is common in the
literature, I remove the uncertainty on " from the workers utility function by
deriving the certainty equivalent, which allows for convenient transformation
4To the best of my knowledge, the only other paper that designs a contract that sig-
nals information to and at the same time screens the other contracting party, using two
continuous instruments, is Soberman (2003). He studies how the combination of price
and warranty may signal a products quality and simultaneously screens customers on
their willingness to pay for warranty. However, an important di¤erence is that Soberman
(2003) abstracts from moral hazard problems: buyers actions are limited to choosing
their preferred price-warranty bundle, and do not otherwise inuence the sellers payo¤.
By contrast, in our model moral hazard is the primary reason for screening, and the
contract moreover serves to alleviate the moral hazard problem.
8
of the utility function into:5
E(ui) = be+ s  1
2
e2   1
2
r2b2 + i(bj)E(j): (2)
The expected payo¤ of a principal of type j is described by
E(j) = (1  b)e  s+ jE(ui); (3)
where jE(ui) captures the altruistic feelings of the principal.6 Analogous
to the workers, I assume that 0  j < 1. Principals di¤er in their type j,
implying that in a separating equilibrium the workers altruism depends on
the specic match between worker and principal.7 I also refer to the workers
altruism as the quality of the relation.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal decides on a
remuneration scheme (b; s). The worker accepts the contract if it yields him
an expected utility of at least his reservation utility u. Hence, as is common
in principal-agent models, workers have no bargaining power, implying non-
employment in equilibrium. Also, I assume that u does not depend on i(b):
the worker has no altruistic feelings towards an employer if he does not work
for that employer. Finally, the worker decides on his optimal e¤ort level e. I
make the standard assumption that e¤ort is non-contractible.
5This standard transformation is only correct when there is no uncertainty on the prin-
cipals type, either because types are observable or because the worker puts all probability
mass on a certain type. Uncertainty on the principals type reduces the workers welfare
compared to the utility suggested by (2). Because we focus on separating equilibria with
two types of principals, there is no uncertainty on the principals type in equilibrium,
and hence it is safe to ignore the workers preference for certaintyfor simplicity. Tak-
ing the e¤ect into account would only strengthen the results, because deviation from the
equilibrium strategy is less attractive when it leads to uncertainty about the principals
type.
6Obviously, the coe¢ cients j and i(bj) depend on the units in which utility is mea-
sured, because utility must be measured in interpersonally comparable units. Therefore,
the principals payo¤ function only makes sense when workers utility is measured by the
transformed utility function (2). Note that both players take the others total payo¤ into
account, so including the immaterialistic part of the payo¤ function. Conning altruism
to both players material payo¤ does not a¤ect the qualitative results, but is inconvenient
analytically.
7When types are observable, it would be possible to assume that the principals altruism
depends on his beliefs about the workers altruism, i.e. j as a function of i (j). However,
when types are unobservable, such an assumption requires that higher-order beliefs are
formed. When the principal would be conditionally altruistic, a workers degree of altruism
would not only depend on his own type and on his beliefs concerning the principals
type, but also on what he believes to be the principals beliefs. The latter determine the
principals actual altruism after all.
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3.2 Analysis when types are observable
In this section, I assume that both players learn about each others type be-
fore they make any decision. I solve for a subgame perfect equilibrium using
backward induction. The workers e¤ort choice follows from maximization of
his utility function (2), which yields the following rst-order condition:
b  e+ i(j)(1  b) = 0: (4)
It is instructive to see what happens if b = 0 or if b = 1. If b = 0, the worker
only exerts e¤ort out of an altruism motive. By contrast, if the worker is
residual claimant (b = 1), his actions do not a¤ect the principals prots.
Therefore, his choice of e¤ort is independent of his altruism: any worker
type equates the marginal costs of e¤ort with the marginal product (e = 1).
Rewriting the rst-order condition (4) gives the workers optimal e¤ort choice
ei :
ei =
b+ i(j)(1  b)

(5)
It can easily be seen that e¤ort increases in nancial incentives for any b
and in the workers altruism as long as b < 1. Also, it is easily veried
that altruism reduces the motivational e¤ect of nancial incentives (de
db
) and
vice versa: incentives reduce the responsiveness of e¤ort towards altruism
( de
d
). The latter e¤ect is intuitive: the larger the share of the marginal
product that accrues to the worker, the smaller the share that accrues to
the principal, hence the smaller the workers possibilities to increase the
principals welfare. Therefore, the model predicts partial crowding-out of
voluntary cooperation.8 The negative e¤ect of altruism on the motivational
e¤ect of nancial incentives follows from the fact that the more the worker
cares for his boss, the less he enjoys his bonus. In the extreme case that i(j)
approaches 1, the worker cannot be motivated by incentive pay because he
cares about the principals payo¤ as much as he cares about his own payo¤.9
The principals choice of the optimal bonus b follows from maximization
of his expected payo¤, where he takes into account the workers response to
8Recall that voluntary cooperation is dened as the di¤erence between actual e¤ort
(ei ) and privately optimal e¤ort (
b
 ). Clearly,
i(j)(1 b)
 is decreasing in the bonus. Note
that similar expressions can be found in Arbak and Kranich (2005) and Sliwka (2007).
9A second e¤ect would arise if I would allow for a cost of e¤ort function that has a
positive third-order derivative. The more altruistic the worker, the more e¤ort he already
exerts out of an altruism motive, which reduces his responsiveness to incentives because
additional e¤ort becomes increasingly costly. Similarly, incentives reduce the responsive-
ness to gift-exchange, which explains the crowding out in Bellemare and Shearer (2009)s
model.
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nancial incentives and the workers participation constraint:
max
s;b
E(j) = (1  b)ei   s+ jE(ui)
s.t. E(ui) = bei + s 
1
2
e2i  
1
2
r2b2 + i(j)E(j)  u:
Since the principal cares more about his own payo¤ than about the workers
utility (0  j < 1), it is not optimal to leave a rent to the worker. The
principal thus reduces the base salary until the participation constraint binds.
Hence, we can insert the base salary implied by the participation constraint
into the objective function:
max
b
E(j) = (1  b)ei  

u  bei +
1
2
e2i +
1
2
r2b2   i(j)E(j)

+ ju:
We obtain the following rst-order condition for optimal incentive provision:
dei
db
(1  ei )  r2b = 0:
This condition elucidates the principals trade-o¤. An increase in the bonus
has one benet and two costs. The benet is that an increase in the bonus
leads to additional e¤ort, which benets the principal with the size of the
marginal product. However, because the workers participation constraint
is binding, the worker needs to be compensated for the marginal cost of
providing e¤ort. Further, risk-averse workers need to be compensated for
exposure to income uncertainty. Clearly, when workers are risk-neutral (r =
0), the rst-order condition implies that the marginal benets of e¤ort are
equated with the marginal costs. We derive the payo¤-maximizing bonus b
by inserting (5) and its derivative into the rst-order condition:
b =
[1  i(j)]2
[1  i(j)]2 + r2
: (6)
Clearly, when workers are risk averse, the bonus decreases in the quality
of the relation i(j). The reason is twofold. First, the more altruistic the
worker, the smaller the motivational e¤ect of nancial incentives. In terms of
the rst-order condition, de

i
db
decreases in i(j), hence reducing the marginal
benet of giving a bonus. The second reason is that the more altruistic the
worker, the more e¤ort he exerts, and consequently the higher his marginal
costs of e¤ort. Because the worker needs to be compensated for his costs of
e¤ort, it is more costly to stimulate e¤ort further using nancial incentives.
Note that when the worker has no altruistic feelings towards his employer
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(i(j) = 0), we obtain the standard solution: the bonus is decreasing in the
amount of risk aversion and in the variance of the error term.
A result that is harder to anticipate is the ambiguous total e¤ect of an
increase in i(j) on e¤ort. On the one hand, additional worker motivation
has a positive e¤ect on e¤ort, but this is possibly more than o¤set by the
corresponding decrease in nancial incentives.10 An increase in i(j) only
has a positive e¤ect on e¤ort when workers are relatively risk-averse. Strong
risk-aversion implies that the bonus is relatively small (b > 1
2
), and there-
fore the reduction in incentives is quantitavely unimportant compared to the
increase in altruistic feelings.
The base salary is such that the workers participation constraint is ex-
actly satised:
s = u  bei +
1
2
e2i +
1
2
r2b2   i(j)E(j):
As long as the principals payo¤is positive11, total compensation is decreasing
in the quality of the relation. The main reason is a compensating wage
di¤erential: the more utility workers derive from the non-monetary aspects of
their jobs, the lower the required monetary compensation. A second reason
is that the strength of nancial incentives decreases in the quality of the
relation, which is reected in a lower risk-premium when workers are risk
averse. Thus, the analysis leads to the following result:
Proposition 1 When types are observable, good relations are associated with
weaker incentives and lower total monetary compensation.
4 Unobservable types: Signaling and screen-
ing
In the previous section I assumed that the quality of the relation is deter-
mined before the contract is written. Although this is a reasonable assump-
10The total derivative de

i
di(j)
is described by
dei
di(j)
=
r2

r2   [1  i(j)]2


[1  i(j)]2 + r2
2 ;
which is positive if r2 > [1  i(j)]2.
11Firms can only stay in business as long as prots are at least zero. It is easily veried
that prots are increasing in relational capital, and so every principal who is more altruistic
than the least altruistic principal in the population obtains a positive payo¤.
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tion when workers have been working at the rm for some time or when
reputational concerns are important, in this section I relax this assumption
and assume that neither the workers type nor the principals type is ob-
servable. Because types are private information, contracts potentially have a
dual role of both signaling the employers type and screening workers types.
I conne this study to separating equilibria, because in these equilibria dif-
ferent contracts are o¤ered by di¤erent types, which leads to predictions on
the how compensation policies relate to the quality of manager-worker re-
lations. By contrast, in pooling equilibria, contracts are independent of the
principals and agents type. I now rst introduce some simplifying assump-
tions. Then, I study a separating equilibrium where the principal signals
his altruism, but abstains from screening worker types. Finally, I consider a
separating equilibrium where the altruistic principal writes a contract that
signals his altruism and simultaneously screens worker types.
4.1 Simplifying assumptions
The rst step in simplifying the problem is to restrict the number of types.
I assume that there are only two types of workers and employers, namely
selsh (l) and (conditionally) altruistic (h) types. A selsh principal has no
altruistic feelings at all: l = 0. Because the principals type is unobservable,
the agents altruism depends on his beliefs concerning the principals type,
denoted bj. When applicable, I rule out unreasonable beliefs by requiring
that beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion.12 In addition, I make some sim-
plifying assumptions on the altruism functions of the worker. Specically, I
assume that a selsh worker type never takes the principals welfare into ac-
count regardless of the principals altruism (l(bj) = 0 for any bj) and that
a reciprocal worker type is completely egoistic when he believes that the
principal is selsh (h(bl) = 0). To make the problem non-trivial, I require
that h(bh) > 0. I assume that a fraction  of all workers is selsh, whereas
the remaining fraction (1  ) is conditionally altruistic. It is not necessary
to introduce notation for the fraction of altruistic principals.13 Finally, I as-
sume that there are more reciprocal workers than altruistic principals, which
12Beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion if, for all out-of-equilibrium actions, zero proba-
bility is assigned to player types that can only lose compared to their equilibrium payo¤,
see Cho and Kreps (1987).
13This does not mean, however, that the fraction of altruistic principals is irrelevant.
Specically, it determines whether it is worthwhile to coordinate on a separating equilib-
rium. The larger the fraction of altruistic principals, the more attractive to coordinate on
a pooling equilibrium instead. Moreover, when there are more altruistic principals than
reciprocal workers, a signaling and screening equilibrium does not exist.
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prevents competition for reciprocal workers when altruistic principals engage
in screening.
4.2 Analysis: Signaling altruism
In this section I study a separating equilibrium where the altruistic principal
writes a contract that signals his altruism. I start the analysis by deriving
the egoistic principals contract choice. Using the assumption that a selsh
principal does not care about workers utility, his payo¤ (see equation (3))
can be written as:
E(l) = (1  bl) [ell + (1  ) ehl]  sl; (7)
where the subscript (l) is used to indicate that the remuneration scheme
fbl; slg is o¤ered by a selsh principal. Similarly, eij denotes the e¤ort of
a worker of type i who faces the incentive scheme o¤ered by a principal of
type j and consequently believes that he is employed by a principal of type
j.14 His e¤ort choice is described by equation (5). Because beliefs should
be correct in equilibrium, a worker of type i observing the contract (bl; sl)
correctly believes that he is employed by a selsh principal, implying that
his expected utility (2) is described by:
E(ui) = bleil + sl   1
2
e2il  
1
2
r2b2l + i(bl)E(l)  u:
Clearly, because i(bl) = 0 irrespective of the workers type, both worker
types exert the same e¤ort and derive the same utility from accepting the
selsh types equilibrium contract. This implies that both types require the
same compensation to satisfy their participation constraint. Because in any
fully separating equilibrium a selsh principal obviously has no reason to
signal his type, he does not distort his optimal contract choice compared
to the case when types are observable. Thus, the selsh principal will o¤er
a bonus bl = 11+r2 and a base salary that exactly satises the workers
participation constraint:
sl = u  bleil + 1
2
e2il +
1
2
r2b2l : (8)
In order to derive the optimal contract choice of the altruistic principal,
it is instructive to inspect his payo¤ function. Assuming that the contract
14Because in equilibrium beliefs are always based on the observed contract o¤er (bl; sl)
or (bh; sh), this shorthand notation su¢ ces to describe the equilibrium contracts.
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(bh; sh) succeeds in credibly signaling the principals altruism, equation (3)
can be rewritten to:
E(h) = (1  bh) [elh + (1  ) ehh]  sh + h [E(ul) + (1  )E(uh)] : (9)
This equation shows that the altruists payo¤ positively depends on the frac-
tion of reciprocal worker types for two reasons. First, as long as bh < 1,
a reciprocal worker will put more e¤ort into his job than a selsh worker
(ehh > elh). Second, a workers expected utility E(ui) increases in his altru-
ism, which is valuable for a principal who has altruistic feelings. For these
two reasons, the altruistic principal may benet from writing a contract that
convinces the reciprocal worker types that he is an altruist. To accomplish
this, the equilibrium contract (bh; sh) should satisfy two incentive compatibil-
ity constraints (ICC): the selsh principal should have no incentive to mimic
the altruist and vice versa:
(1  bl)el   sl  (1  bh)eh   sh; (ICC1)
(1 bl)el sl+hu  (1 bh)eh sh+h [E (ul) + (1  )E (uh)] ; (ICC2)
where el = ell + (1  ) ehl and eh = elh + (1  ) ehh. It is essential to
note that when ICC1 is satised, ICC2 can only be satised if the di¤erence
h [E (ul) + (1  )E (uh)]   hu is large enough. This observation reveals
why in equilibrium a principal with altruistic feelings is willing to engage
in costly signaling: because he enjoys workers utility to some extent, his
payo¤ increases when a reciprocal worker believes him to be an altruist.
Thus, an altruistic principal is willing to signal his type because he values
good relations in the workplace. By contrast, the aforementioned observation
reveals that the resulting di¤erence in e¤ort (eh   el) is no motive for
signaling in equilibrium. The reason is that a selsh principal will imitate
any contract that yields a higher monetary payo¤ than his own equilibrium
contract. Therefore, the di¤erence in e¤ort (eh   el) must be reected in
higher payments to the worker.
Reasoning further along these lines, it is straightforward to show that
ICC1 is always binding. When the altruistic principal ignores ICC1, he
chooses the same contract as when types are observable. Such a contract
clearly satises both workersparticipation constraint and ICC2. However,
such a contract violates ICC1: because prots are increasing in the workers
altruism, the egoistic principal nds it highly protable to mimick the altru-
istic employer. Therefore, ICC1 must be binding in equilibrium, implying
that the optimal contract will be a (bh; sh) combination such that ICC1
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holds with equality and that ICC2 is slack.15
In addition to the two incentive compatibility constraints, the altruistic
principals equilibrium contract should satisfy both workers participation
contraint (PC).16 The selsh workers PC is described by
bhelh + sh   1
2
e2lh  
1
2
r2b2h  u: (PCL)
Assuming that the contract (bh; sh) credibly signals the principals altruism,
the reciprocal workers PC is described by
bhehh + sh   1
2
e2hh  
1
2
r2b2h + h(bh)E(h)  u: (PCH)
Comparison of these two constraints reveals that reciprocal workers derive
more utility from a given equilibrium contract than selsh workers. This
implies that when the selsh workers PC is satised, the reciprocal workers
PC is also satised. Because the equilibrium contract (bh; sh) by assumption
satises the selsh workers PC, the reciprocal workers PC cannot be binding
in the proposed equilibrium.
The altruistic principals objective is to write a contract that maximizes
his expected payo¤, provided the four constraints outlined above are satis-
ed. Because PCH and ICC2 are both slack, I can reformulate the problem
in a convenient way. Since the altruistic principals monetary payo¤ is con-
strained by the prots earned by the egoistic principal, he maximizes his
total payo¤ by choosing a contract that exactly satises ICC1 and maxi-
mizes the expected utility of his worker. The maximization problem can
thus be formulated as:
max
sh;bh
E (ul) + (1  )E(uh)
s.t. sh = (1  bh)eh   E(l); (ICC1)
s.t. bhelh + sh   1
2
e2lh  
1
2
r2b2h  u: (PCL)
Intuitively, a reasonable conjecture is that maximization of workers utility
ensures that the selsh workers PC is satised. For ease of exposition, I
15Obviously, the altruistic principal should o¤er a di¤erent contract than the egoist,
i.e. the contract (bh = bl; sh = sl) is not feasible. This condition is always satised except
when r2 = 0. However, for tractability we assume that r2 > 0.
16In this section, we assume that both worker types must be willing to work for an
altruistic employer or a selsh employer, i.e. E(ui)  u for both types. As we will see in
the next section, the altruistic employer may nd it optimal to o¤er a contract that selects
the reciprocal workers only.
16
assume that PCL is satised and conrm afterwards that our conjecture is
correct. This allows us to rewrite the problem by substitution of E (ul),
E(uh), and sh, yielding the following:
max
bh


elh   1
2
e2lh  
1
2
r2b2h

+
(1  )

ehh   1
2
e2hh  
1
2
r2b2h + h(bh)E(h)  E(l):
Taking the derivative to bh gives an insightful rst-order condition:


delh
dbh
(1  elh)  r2bh

+ (1  )

dehh
dbh
(1  ehh)  r2bh

= 0:
The rst-order condition is the same as in the observable types case, but
weighted according to the prevalence of the two worker types. Therefore,
depending on the fraction of selsh workers in the population (), the payo¤-
maximizing bonus bh lies between b =
[1 h(bh)]2
[1 h(bh)]2+r2 and bl = 11+r2 , imply-
ing that an altruistic principal o¤ers a lower bonus than a selsh principal.
This can also be seen after rewriting the rst-order condition:
bh =
 + (1  ) [1  h(bh)]2
 + (1  ) [1  h(bh)]2 + r2 :
Thus, the best an altruistic principal can do is to o¤er the bonus that maxi-
mizes the joint surplus and increase the base salary up to the point that the
selsh principal is not any longer willing to imitate.
However, this does not imply that the altruistic principal pays a higher
expected total compensation than his egoistic counterpart. The altruistic
principal only pays a larger expected total compensation when workers pro-
vide more e¤ort on average. To see this, it is convenient to use the fact that
ICC1 is binding in equilibrium. Rewriting ICC1 gives:
bheh + sh = blel + sl + eh   el
Clearly, whether total expected compensation paid by the altruistic principal
exceeds that of the selsh principal depends on the di¤erence in average
e¤ort eh  el. When the altruistic principals equilibrium contract does not
induce workers to provide more e¤ort on average, credibly signaling altruism
does not necessitate paying higher compensation. As shown in the observable
types case, a good relation does not automatically lead to more e¤ort, because
the intensity of nancial incentives decreases in the quality of the relation,
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i.e. bh < bl. Therefore, we cannot be sure that altruistic workers exert
more e¤ort when employed by an altruistic principal, whereas selsh workers
unambiguously provide less e¤ort. Thus, paying a su¢ ciently high total
expected compensation will always be interpreted as a signal of altruism,
but a low total compensation does not necessarily disprove altruism as long
as it is accompanied by weak nancial incentives.
Proposition 2 In a signaling equilibrium, good relations are associated with
weaker incentives, but not necessarily with higher total compensation.
The equilibrium is illustrated by gure 1.17 The equations underlying
the picture are presented in appendix B. The gure shows ICC1 for two
di¤erent values of h(bh) and the participation constraints PCL and PCH.
Thus, ICC1 represents an isoprot curve that indicates the minimum base
salary required to keep the selsh principal from imitating.18 Similarly, PCL
and PCH are indi¤erence curves representing the lowest base salary that is
acceptable to selsh and reciprocal workers respectively. The arrows thus
indicate the area of feasible contracts. The dotted line represents a weighted
average of the indi¤erence curves, thus representing a hypothetical average
worker. The optimum is where the indi¤erence curve of the hypothetical
average worker is tangent to ICC1. The corresponding bonus maximizes the
joint surplus.
For the remainder of the paper, it is important to understand the intuition
behind the curves. The slope of ICC1 depends on h(bh): it has an inverted
u-shape provided (1   )h(bh) < 12 , but is always decreasing in the bonus
when (1 )h(bh) > 12 . The intuition is that ICC1 consists of two e¤ects. On
the one hand, workers e¤ort is increasing in the bonus, requiring an increase
in the base salary to keep the selsh principal from mimicking. On the other
hand, an increase in the bonus reduces the share of the marginal product that
accrues to the principal, allowing for a decrease in the base salary. Since
the e¤ort of highly reciprocal workers is relatively high and insensitive to
incentive pay, the latter e¤ect dominates when (1 )h(bh) > 12 . Both PCL
and PCH may slope downwards or upwards, the latter case being depicted in
gures 1 and 2. The reason is that an increase in the expected bonus payment
has an ambiguous e¤ect on workers utility. On the one hand, the additional
payment benets the worker, implying that the base salary should decrease
17The equilibrium exists for all parameter values, provided h(bh) > 0 and r2 > 0.
All other equilibria can be ruled out by applying the intuitive criterion.
18Specically, ICC1 represents the isoprot curve of the egoistic principal who imitates
the altruist. This is identical to the material part of the altruistic principals isopayo¤
curve.
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to keep expected utility constant. On the other hand, an increase in the
bonus exposes the worker to more risk, for which he must be compensated.
The latter e¤ect dominates when r2 > 1. The reciprocal workers PC
(PCH) is always below PCL, which follows from the fact that a reciprocal
worker derives more utility from the same contract than an egoist. Moreover,
PCH is more inclined to slope downwards than PCL. The reason is that the
altruistic worker always exerts more e¤ort than the egoist, implying that a
given increase in the bonus leads to a larger increase in expected payments for
the altruistic worker than for the egoistic worker. Therefore, a larger decrease
(or a smaller increase) in the base salary is required to keep expected utility
at the same level.
Two important observations need to be made. The rst is that there is
always a point on PCL that represents the contract o¤ered by the selsh
employer, namely (bl; sl). Since PCL is the selsh workers indi¤erence curve
yielding his reservation utility E(ul) = u, the contract (bl; sl) is necessarily
a point on PCL, as depicted in gures 1 and 2. The second observation is
that when the altruistic employer o¤ers bh equal to bl, ICC1 requires that
sh > sl. The reason is that all contracts on ICC1 are assumed to succeed in
signaling (and screening in the next section), including the selsh principals
o¤er (bl; sl). Since for a given bonus e¤ort is higher when the principal is
believed to be an altruist, it must be that for bh = bl, sh > sl to discourage
the egoistic principal from imitating.
Finally, recall that I still have to show that the equilibrium contract
(bh; sh) satises PCL. There are three considerations why the selsh workers
utility may be higher or lower than his reservation utility. First, the selsh
worker benets from the reciprocal workers productivity: the latters rela-
tively high productivity must be reected in the base salary to ensure that
altruistic principals expected monetary pay-o¤ does not exceed the selsh
principals prots. This free-rider e¤ect is manifest in gure 1 by the fact
that for bh = bl, sh > sl. Second, the bonus is not set optimally accord-
ing to the preferences of the selsh worker type: the bonus bh compromises
the preferences of both worker types, as shown above. Third, the bonus af-
fects the distribution of the total surplus between the selsh and reciprocal
worker. Because a selsh worker provides less e¤ort than a reciprocal worker,
changes in the bonus have a smaller e¤ect on the selsh workers utility. As
a consequence, the fact that bh < bl benets the selsh worker relative to the
reciprocal worker. This can be seen in gure 1 from the fact that the PCL is
steeper than PCH, implying that the selsh type gains from a decrease in the
bonus and a corresponding change in the base salary that keeps the altruists
utility unchanged. I prove in appendix A that the third e¤ect dominates the
second e¤ect, and hence that PCL is always satised.
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Figure 1
4.3 Analysis: Signaling altruism and screening work-
ers
In this section I study a separating equilibrium where the altruistic principal
writes a contract that signals his altruism and simultaneously screens worker
types. The analysis proceeds along the same lines as in the previous section. I
start the analysis by deriving the egoistic principals contract choice. Because
all workers are completely egoistic when they believe that the principal is
selsh (i.e. i(bl) = 0), it is easily veried that a selsh principal has no
signaling or screening motive in equilibrium. Lacking signaling and screening
motives, a selsh principal does not distort his contract choice compared to
the case when types are observable. Thus, I easily obtain the same result as
in the previous section: the selsh principal will o¤er a bonus bl = 11+r2
and the smallest base salary workers are willing to accept.
Deriving the altruistic principals contract choice is more complicated. As
shown in the previous section, the altruistic principals utility is increasing
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in the fraction of reciprocal workers, provided he convinces them that he is
an altruist. Therefore, he may benet from writing a contract that selects
reciprocal workers only. Screening of worker types can be accomplished by
o¤ering a contract (bh; sh) that is unacceptable to selsh worker types, but is
attractive for reciprocal workers. Since both workers expect to obtain their
reservation utility u when they accept the selsh principals contract, screen-
ing requires that the contract simultaneously violates PCL and satises PCH.
For ease of exposition, I refer to violating PCL as satisfying the screening
constraint (SCC):
bhelh + sh   1
2
e2lh  
1
2
r2b2h  u: (SCC)
The proposed equilibrium contract should not only screen worker types,
but also signal the principals altruism. Thus, the contract should satisfy
the two incentive compatibility constraints. Assuming that SCC and PCH
are satised, the incentive compatibility constraints ICC1 and ICC2 can be
written as:
(1  bl)ell   sl  (1  bh)ehh   sh (ICC1)
(1  bl)ell   sl + hu  (1  bh)ehh   sh + hE(uh) (ICC2)
Since the structure of the problem is unchanged compared to the previous
section, the same reasoning applies to show that ICC1 is always binding
and hence ICC2 is slack. Because prots are increasing in the workers
altruism, a selsh principal is always willing to imitate an altruistic principal,
unless the altruistic principal explicitly takes ICC1into account. Moreover,
we observed in the previous section that when the principal abstains from
screening workers, PCL is always satised. Therefore, succesful screening
requires that SCC is explicitly taken into account and hence is also binding.
As in the previous section, a reasonable conjecture is that PCH is irrelevant:
because the altruistic principals monetary payo¤ is constrained by ICC1,
the best he can do is to maximize the reciprocals workers utility (taking
SCC into account). Again I will check afterwards whether our conjecture is
correct. I can write the problem as follows:
max
bh;sh
E(uh) = bhehh + sh   1
2
e2hh  
1
2
r2b2h + h(bh)E(h)
s.t. sh = (1  bh)ehh   E(l) (ICC1)
s.t. bhelh + sh   1
2
e2lh  
1
2
r2b2h  u (SCC)
Since both ICC1and SCC are binding, I conclude that the equilibrium is at
an intersection point of ICC1and SCC. This also proves that the reciprocal
workers PC is satised, because when SCC is binding, PCH is slack.
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Figure 2 illustrates that the equilibrium is at an intersection of ICC1and
SCC. The similarity with gure 1 should be clear: it shows ICC1, SCC and
PCH. Recall that the altruistic principal chooses the point on ICC1that
maximizes the reciprocal workers expected utility. By shifting the altruistic
workers indi¤erence curve (PCH) up, it can easily be seen that, given the
constraints, his expected utility is maximized at an intersection of ICC1and
SCC, specically the intersection that species bh > bl.
Figure 2
It can be shown that this is a more general result. In what follows, I
will show that an equilibrium always exists and that it is characterized by
a bonus bh on the interval (bl; 1). To prove existence, rst recall that for
bh = bl, ICC1lies above SCC. It can be shown that when bh = 1, ICC1
is always below SCC, and hence an intersection point on the interval (bl; 1)
always exists. There is a clear intuition for this fact. When bh = 1, the agent
is the full residual claimant and SCC thus species the amount he is willing
to pay for the rm. This amount is equal to the expected revenues minus
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the costs of e¤ort, risk-bearing and the outside option.19 Similarly, because
the altruistic principal is no residual claimant, ICC1species the maximum
possible amount the principal receives for the rm: this amount should not
exceed the prots made by the selsh principal. The selsh principals prots
are given by the expected revenues minus the compensation for the workers
e¤ort, risk and outside option.20 The amount the worker is willing to pay
for the rm (SCC) is always smaller than the prots made by the selsh
principal (ICC1), because the selsh principal sets the bonus at the surplus-
maximizing level (bl < 1). By contrast, when the altruistic principal makes
the worker full residual claimant (bh = 1), he exposes the worker to an
ine¢ cient amount of risk, which reduces his willingness to pay for ownership
of the rm. Noting that when (ICC1) and (SCC) are expressed as a base
salary, both amounts are negative, we thus conclude that an intersection
point on the interval (bl; 1) always exists.
When there are two intersection points, the principal prefers the bonus at
the intersection point on the interval (bl; 1). Consider the case when h(bh) is
small, implying that ICC1 has an inverted u-shape (see gure 2). The prin-
cipal prefers the intersection point that species the highest bonus, because
an increase in the bonus is more benecial for the reciprocal worker than
the egoistic worker due to the formers higher e¤ort. The reciprocal workers
higher e¤ort is reected in his indi¤erence curve (PCH) that is more inclined
to slope downwards. Moving along an egoistic workers indi¤erence curve
(SCC) therefore increases the reciprocal workers expected payo¤. Thus, the
principal prefers the equilibrium contract at the intersection on the interval
(bl; 1). When the SCC is downward sloping, a second intersection point may
also exist when h(bh) is su¢ ciently high and bh > 1. However, I show
in appendix A that the intersection point on the interval (bl; 1) is strictly
preferred. Finally, the total expected compensation earned/paid by the al-
19To see this, let sSCCh denote the maximum salary the SCC allows for. The selsh
workers willingness to pay ( sSCCh ) can be found by rewriting the SCC and inserting
bh = 1:
 sSCCh = elh  
1
2
e2lh  
1
2
r2   u:
20Let sICC1
0
h denote the base salary that keeps the egoistic principal from imitating.
Inserting bh = 1 into ICC1, we obtain that  sICC10h = E (l). Thus, the maximum
amount the altruistic principal can receive for the rm ( sICC10h ) is equal to the selsh
agents prots. Using equations (7) and (8), we can write E (l) as:
 sICC10h = E (l) = ell  
1
2
e2ll  
1
2
r2b2l   u:
Since bl is the surplus maximizing bonus, E (l) >  sSCCh , implying that sICC1
0
h < s
SCC
h .
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truistic worker/principal is always larger than that of the selsh type.21 The
reason is that because the reciprocal worker unambiguously provides more
e¤ort in equilibrium (ehh > ell), the altruistic principal has to pay more to en-
sure that his expected monetary payo¤does not exceed the selsh principals
prots. To summarize:
Proposition 3 In a signaling and screening equilibrium, good relations are
associated with stronger incentives and larger total compensation.
These results stand in remarkable contrast with the preceding results.
The reason for these diverging ndings is that screening can (most e¢ -
ciently) be accomplished by o¤ering stronger incentives than otherwise op-
timal. These excessively strong incentives reduce the total surplus and di-
minish the attractiveness of the contract for the selsh worker, which is
inevitable in order to satisfy both the screening constraint and ICC1. Be-
cause the reciprocal worker faces stronger incentives than the selsh worker,
he unambiguously provides more e¤ort, implying that the altruistic principal
has to pay more than the selsh principal to discourage him from imitating.
One may wonder whether the altruistic principal prefers this signaling and
screening equilibrium above the signaling equilibrium. Because his prots
are identical in the two situations (namely the same as the selsh principals
payo¤), the equilibrium that yields the largest immaterial payo¤ (or, equiv-
alently, the highest average worker utility) is preferred. Screening of worker
types has the advantage that only altruistic worker types are attracted, which
has a positive e¤ect on average worker utility. However, screening is also
costly: the bonus is distorted compared to the e¢ cient bonus level. Clearly,
incurring the costs of screening is unattractive when the large majority of
workers is altruistic, but attractive when the fraction of altruistic workers is
small. I provide a formal proof in appendix A.
5 Concluding remarks
I have studied the relation between gift-exchange, the power of incentives,
and worker heterogeneity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model.
Following Levine (1998), I have assumed that some agents care more for
their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them.
21As in the previous section, this can be seen from rewriting ICC1:
bhehh + sh = blell + sl + ehh   ell;
implying that bhehh + sh > blell + sl since ehh > ell.
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Abstracting from the incomplete information problem, I have found that
good manager-worker relations substitute for incentives and allow for a re-
duction in total expected compensation, as the quality of the relation is re-
ected in a compensating wage di¤erential. Assuming that types are private
information, I have found that principals signal their altruism by o¤ering
relatively weak incentives, but not necessarily by paying a relatively high to-
tal expected compensation. The key to understanding this result is that the
bonus and the xed salary simultaneously provide cues about the principals
altruism. Expecting that a gift-exchange relation will be established, altru-
istic principals provide relatively weak incentives because the agents and
principals preferences are more aligned under gift-exchange. As a result of
the low incentive-intensity, gift-exchange may be associated with relatively
low productivity, and therefore a relatively low compensation may already
su¢ ce to distinguish the altruistic principal from the selsh type. Finally,
assuming that some agents do not reciprocate the principals altruism, the
principal may nd it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously signals
his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I have shown that such
a contract is characterised by excessively strong incentives and a relatively
high expected total compensation. Incentives are a suitable instrument for
screening workers altruism, because altruistic workers put in more e¤ort
than selsh workers and hence gain more from output-contingent pay. Thus,
strong incentives are o¤ered to attract the workers who need them least.
Although the model is highly stylized, the results can be generalized to
less restrictive settings. First, the relevance of the observable types case may
well extend beyond an instructive benchmark case. Although full observ-
ability is a strong assumption, workers typically receive highly informative
signals about the employers care for them regardless of the information that
is contained in the wage contract. Thus, I am condent that the gist of the
results extends to a setting where workers receive a su¢ ciently informative
signal of the principals type. Second, for ease of exposition I assumed that
all workers are completely egoistic when they believe that the principal is self-
ish, and that a selsh worker never takes a principals payo¤ into account.
Relaxing these assumptions complicates the analysis, but does not a¤ect the
results qualitatively. The main complication is that selsh principals also
have an incentive to screen when some workers care about the principals
welfare, even if they believe that the principal is selsh. Therefore, selsh
principals will o¤er two di¤erent contracts, yielding the same level of prof-
its. Third, the qualitative results do not change when there is free entry of
selsh employers. Finally, relaxing the assumption that all workers have the
same reservation utility does not a¤ect the qualitative results when types are
private information. When types are observable, reciprocal workers better
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outside option may (but need not) induce the principal to pay them higher
wages.
An empirical implication of the model is that the association between
total expected compensation and the quality of manager-worker relations
depends on the workers uncertainty about the principals type. To the ex-
tent that workers uncertainty can be proxied by tenure, a positive relation
between total compensation and the quality of the relation is more likely for
less tenured workers. The model also predicts that gift-exchange relations are
associated with weaker incentives. Unfortunately, most employment surveys
are silent on the strength of incentives an individual receives. They only pro-
vide information on whether workers receive bonus pay. It is straightforward,
however, to reinterpret the model by assuming that incentive pay can only be
implemented at a xed cost.22 The empirical prediction then becomes that
rms with good relations are less likely to implement a pay-for-performance
scheme. The reason is that the implementation of a costly incentive scheme
is less worthwhile when managers can also rely on altruism as a motivational
force.
Of course, there are several limitations to the analysis. A rst limita-
tion is that I only looked at monetary rewards, while employers typically
have other instruments to stimulate or control workers, such as work rules,
work organisation, minimum e¤ort requirements, task assignment or giving
personal attention to workers. Previous studies suggest that e¤ects of these
policies on gift-exchange relations cannot be studied in isolation. Hence, it
may be worthwhile to investigate these issues further. A second point is
that our Levine-type approach of modeling altruism ignores fairness consid-
erations in the sense that people may have some idea of what constitutes a
fair income, and reciprocate when income falls below. Thus, it may not be
su¢ cient that the contract distinguishes an altruistic principal from a selsh
principal, the compensation should also be perceived as fair. This could pre-
clude a compensating wage di¤erential, although the notion of fair income
may take the quality of the relation into account. Third, the existence of
a signaling and screening equilibrium crucially depends on the assumption
that the number of altruistic principals does not exceed the number of recip-
rocal workers. By contrast, when altruistic principals compete for reciprocal
workers, the signaling equilibrium always gives a higher payo¤ and hence is
the only equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion. Moreover, a signal-
ing equilibrium does not exist when an altruistic principal can increase his
22It should be noted that the signaling and screening equilibrium cannot be reinterpreted
so easily. When introducing a bonus is not worthwhile for the selsh principal, the gains
from screening must be extremely large to induce the selsh principal to introduce a bonus.
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payo¤ by deviating to a screening contract. Finally, in large organizations
wages are not always determined by the relevant managers, and the inter-
pretation as a gift may therefore be problematic. It would be interesting to
see how wage-setting institutions such as wage bargaining with trade unions
impact on the prospects for establishing gift-exchange relations. Thus, there
is ample room for further research, both theoretically and empirically.
6 Appendix A: formal proofs
6.1 Proof that PCL is always satised.
This appendix contains the proof that in a signaling equilibrium, the selsh
workers PC is always satised. First note that when h(bh) = 0 both
principals o¤er the same contract and hence both worker types obtain their
reservation utility u. By taking the derivative to h(bh), I show that the
selsh workers expected utility E(ul) increases in h(bh) and hence always
exceeds his reservation utility.
dE(ul)
dh(bh) = dbhdh(bh)

delh
dbh
(bh   elh) + elh   r2bh

+
dsh
dh(bh) : (A1)
Because ICC1 is binding, dsh
dh(bh) is dened as:
dsh
dh(bh) = (1  bh) (1  ) dehhdh(bh)+
dbh
dh(bh)

(1  bh)


delh
dbh
+ (1  ) dehh
dbh

  eh

(A2)
Combining these expressions and applying the envelop theorem (utility max-
imization implies that bh   elh = 0), we obtain:
dE(ul)
dh(bh) = (1  ) (1  bh) dehhdh(bh) + dbhdh(bh) (1  ) (elh   ehh)  r2bh
+(1  bh) dbh
dh(bh)


delh
dbh
+ (1  ) dehh
dbh

This can be rewritten further to elicit the three e¤ects described in the main
text:
dE(ul)
dh(bh) = (1  ) (1  bh) dehhdh(bh) +  dbhdh(bh)

delh
dbh
(1  bh)  r2bh

+(1  ) dbh
dh(bh)

dehh
dbh
(1  bh)  r2bh + (elh   ehh)

:
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The rst term is a pure free-rider e¤ect: because ICC1 is binding, the selsh
worker benets to some extent from the additional e¤ort of the reciprocal
worker. The second term is negative (since dbh
dh(bh) < 0 and the term between
brackets is positive) and captures that bh is not set according to the selsh
agents preferences. The third term is positive (since dbh
dh(bh) < 0 and the
term between brackets is negative) and reects the fact that the selsh worker
gets a relatively larger share of the surplus when the bonus is reduced. After
considerable rewriting (using the rst-order conditions for optimal e¤ort and
expressions for elh and ehh), we obtain:
dE(ul)
dh(bh) = (1  ) (1  bh)

dbh
dh(bh)

 h(bh)h(bh)

+
dehh
dh(bh)

> 0;
which shows that the third e¤ect dominates the second e¤ect when h(bh) >
0, and that the total e¤ect on the selsh workers utility is always positive.
Hence, the selsh workers utility is always higher than his reservation utility.
Note that this implies that in a signaling and screening equilibrium, SCC is
always binding.
6.2 Proof that an equilibrium where bh > 1 is inferior
to bh 2 (bl; 1).
In this appendix, I show that an intersection point of SCC and ICC1where
bh > 1 gives a strictly lower payo¤ than when bh 2 (bl; 1), and can there-
fore be ruled out by the intuitive criterion. I refer to appendix B for the
mathematical expressions used here. Necessary conditions for existence of
such an intersection point are that SCC slopes downwards, i.e. r2 < 1,
and that h(bh) is so high that SCC is steeper than ICC1for bh > 1, i.e.
dsICC1h
dbh
>
dsSCCh
dbh
. To prove that the altruistic worker and principal prefer the
equilibrium where bh 2 (bl; 1), it su¢ ces to show that PCH has a atter slope
than ICC1when bh > bl, implying that the altruistic worker gains when the
bonus is reduced along ICC1. Stated otherwise, I show that ds
ICC1
h
dbh
<
dsPCHh
dbh
for bh > bl. Inserting the expressions provided in appendix B, I obtain after
considerable rewriting:
1  2h(bh)1  12h(bh)

(1  bh) < bh
 
1 + r2

:
It is straightforward to verify that this inequality holds for all bh > bl. This
proves that the altruistic worker prefers the equilibrium on the interval (bl; 1).
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6.3 Conditions under which signaling and screening is
attractive.
This appendix shows under what conditions the principal prefers the signal-
ing and screening equilibrium above the signaling equilibrium. First note
that when h(bh) = 0, the payo¤ is equal in both equilibria. I now consider
how the principals payo¤ changes when h(bh) increases in both equilibria,
where the change in the principals payo¤ is equal to the change in total
utility.
In a signaling equilibrium, the e¤ect of a change in h(bh) on total utility
is given by  dE(ul)
dh(bh) + (1  ) dE(uh)dh(bh) , or after some rewriting:

dE(ul)
dh(bh) + (1  ) dE(uh)dh(bh) = (1  )

(1  bh) dehh
dh(bh) + E (h)

:
This has a simple interpretation; the gain in total utility when h(bh) in-
creases is equal to the additional productivity of the reciprocal types (re-
ected in the base salary), plus their increased utility from the immaterial
aspect of the job. Workers utility is convex in h(bh), because bh is decreas-
ing and hence dehh
dh(bh) is increasing in h(bh).
Similarly, in a signaling and screening equilibrium the e¤ect of a change
in h(bh) on total utility is given by dE(uh)dh(bh) , or:
dE(uh)
dh(bh) = dbhdh(bh)

dehh
dbh
(1  ehh)  r2bh

+ (1  bh) dehh
dh(bh) + E (h) :
The rst part is negative and represents the loss in worker utility because bh
is suboptimally high. The second part has a similar interpretation as in a
signaling equilibrium, but keeping the bonus constant, it is larger because all
workers are reciprocal instead of a fraction (1  ). The rst part is zero if
h(bh) = 0, but becomes smaller (increases in absolute value) when h(bh)
becomes larger. The second part is concave in h(bh), because bh is increasing
and hence dehh
dh(bh) is decreasing in h(bh).
The signaling and screening equilibrium is always preferred for h(bh)
su¢ ciently close to zero. The reason is that reciprocal workers only are
attracted. When h(bh) increases, the cost of distorting the bonus becomes
more severe, and at some point the signaling equilibrium will be preferred.
The larger the fraction of selsh workers , the more attractive to screen
workers.
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7 Appendix B: The constraints and their prop-
erties.
This section provides the mathematical expressions for ICC1, ICC1, SCC
(or, equivalently, PCL) and PCH that underly the gures, and proves some
of their properties described in the main text. Rewriting ICC1 yields:
sh  (1  bh)eh   [(1  bl)el   sl] :
I now show that the base salary that keeps the egoist from imitating, denoted
sICC1h , decreases in the bonus as long as (1   bh)eh decreases in the bonus.
This is always the case when (1  ) h(bh) > 12 , implying that eh is rather
large and insensitive to increases in the bonus. Using equation (5) for the
workers e¤ort choice and equation (6) for bl, I obtain:
sICC1h = (1  bh)

bh

+ (1  ) h(bh)(1  bh)


  1
2
1
(1 + r2)
+ u:
Inspection of the derivative to bh proves that the minimum base salary re-
quired by ICC1 initially increases in the bonus provided (1  ) h(bh) < 12 ,
but always decreases in the bonus when (1  ) h(bh) > 12 :
dsICC1h
dbh
=
 2 [bh + (1  ) h(bh)(1  bh)] + 1

:
The derivation of ICC1and its derivative to bh merely requires inserting
 = 0 into the expressions above.
Assuming that the screening constraint (or, equivalently, PCL) holds with
equality, SCC can be rewritten to:
sSCCh = u 
b2h
2
 
1  r2 :
Clearly, the maximum salary the SCC allows for, denoted sSCCh , decreases in
the bonus when r2 < 1 and increases in the bonus when r2 > 1. For
ease of later comparison, I provide the derivative to bh:
dsSCCh
dbh
=  bh

 
1  r2 :
Finally, the derivation of the altruistic workers PC (PCH) proceeds along
the same lines:
sPCHh = u 
b2h
2
 
1  r2+ h(bh)2
2
(1  bh)2   h(bh)E(h);
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This expression is not particularly insightful, but by taking the derivative to
bh it can easily be seen that compared to SCC, PCH is more inclined to slope
downwards as long as bh  1:
dsPCHh
dbh
=  bh


1  r2  h(bh)2

[1  bh] :
This is clearly smaller than the derivative of SCC for all bh  1.
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